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The Adverse Impact of Remote
Command and Control under
Live Fire
Kip Smith, Unkoping University, Unkoping, Sweden
The US Army is planning a shift in the mode of command and control between soldiers and their
battlefield leaders. Soldiers will receive orders from afar through electronic means of communica-
tion. This practice is known as remote command and control. Reliance on remote command and
control has the potential to erode trust between soldiers and their leaders and should, we hypothe-
size, slow soldiers' response times to commands to move and to shoot. We have conducted two
field experiments to test this hypothesis (Pangburn, Freund, Pangburn, & Smith, 2003). Our labo-
ratory was a paintball assault lane. While a paintball lane is not actual combat, we have found that
its live but non-lethal fire makes it an effective and ethical laboratory for studying the behavioral
and cognitive effects of stress induced by live fire. Participants were exposed to two conditions of
communication mode, leader-present (face to face) and leader-remote (two-way radio). The con-
trast between participants' response times to commands to move and to shoot was statistically
significant and was consistent with the predicted decrement in the remote command-and-control
condition.
Introduction
The pervasive specter of death makes the battlefield a prototypical extreme environ-
ment. Troop survival requires vigilant and efficient teamwork, effective leadership, and
the sporadic madness of heroism. The effectiveness of a battlefield leader is a direct
function of the trust felt by the members of the fighting unit. Trust in the leader makes
the battlefield feel less extreme, promotes teamwork, and encourages heroism.
The link between a battlefield unit and its immediate leader has traditionally been ver-
bal and direct. Face-to-face contact and mutual hardship have long been the forge of
trust. To use a term coined during the recent invasion of Iraq, trust emerges because the
leader has been 'embedded' in the unit.
For soldiers in the U. S. infantry and their immediate leaders, this foundation of trust
is about to disappear. The battlefield environment will soon become even more extreme.
The fundamental change is in the mode of communication between soldiers on the
battlefield and their immediate leaders. One of the cornerstones of the U. S. Army's plan
for modernizing the infantry is to have soldiers on the battlefield receive orders from afar
through electronic means of communication. This practice is known as 'remote com-
mand and control.' The soldiers who will operate under this plan will no longer take their
battle commands from a leader standing within visual range. The only connection with
their commanding officers will be their radios or other electronic information devices.
We suspect that this fundamental organizational change is likely to do more than
remove the leader from the battlefield. It will also erode the development of common
ground (Clark, 1996) between soldiers and their leader. We expect the erosion of com-
mon ground to have profoundly negative implications for the development of trust and
for the effectiveness of the fighting unit.
Common ground is special form of intentional thinking (e.g., Dennett, 1997). You
have an intentional thought whenever you think about another person's (or group's)
thinking. You and another (person or group) have common ground whenever you both
know what each other knows and you both know that each other knows it (Clark, 1996).
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This mutual knowledge of a shared representation of
information is the essence of common ground. The mili-
tary works troops hard during basic and more advanced
training so that they may develop common ground
through mutual hardship and interdependence. Common
ground has traditionally been the glue that holds a fight-
ing unit together.
We believe that common ground works to support the
development of trust in a leader and in the leader's
authority. A leader who is (and has always been) in the
field with his troops should have more credibility than an
absent or remote leader. Accordingly, the use of remote
communication can be expected to degrade or eliminate
the mutual knowledge of a shared representation of infor-
mation and, as a result, the leader's ability to exercise
authority. We hypothesize that the lack of a basis for com-
mon ground will be reflected in slower reaction times
when commands are given remotely via electronic
devices than when they are given face-to-face.
In the two experiments presented here, we test this
hypothesis in an ecologically valid simulation of the bat-
tlefield environment, namely, a paintball assault lane.
Method
Participants
Forty-two college students, five women and 37 men,
drawn primarily from an introductory psychology class,
volunteered to spend a Saturday afternoon playing paint-
ball on our simulated assault lane. The average and
median age was 19 with a range of 18 to 26. All signed
informed consent forms and liability releases. All partici-
pants were treated according to APA guidelines.
Design, Measures, and Task
We manipulated leader presence at two levels (present
and remote) in a within-subjects design. We measured the
participant's response time to the leader's commands to
move and to shoot. We predict slower response times in
the leader-remote condition. We expect that the effect of
leader presence will not be strong under normal circum-
stances, but that it will emerge in the relatively extreme
environment of simulated combat.
The simulated combat environment in this study is a
paintball assault lane, Figure 1. The lane consisted of
eight protective stations behind which the participants
could hide. At the end of the lane was a fortified position
where a sniper was positioned. The sniper's task was to
shoot participants as they moved up the lane. The partic-
ipants advanced through the lane one at a time. Each
participant had two tasks. The first task was to move
from station to station up the lane in response to the com-
mand to move. The second task was to shoot targets in
response to the command to shoot. Statistical analysis
used a within-subjects t test of the mean difference in
response times between the leader-remote and leader-
present conditions. The response times to commands to
move and shoot were recorded by an observer using a
stopwatch.
For the first experiment, the US Army provided access
to the 25 ft x 200 ft building at Range 52, Fort Riley, Kan-
sas, home of the US Army 1st Infantry and an active
training center for artillery. We set up our paintball assault
lane in this building. As shown in Figure 1, the lane con-
sisted of a staggered series of eight 'stations' behind
which the participant could take cover. At the far end of
the lane, a 'sniper' hid behind a screen of netting and pro-







Figure 1. The layout ofthe paintball assault lane.
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building with many windows, the leader in the remote con-
dition was able to be completely out of the participant's
sight while still able to view the assault lane.
Twenty students participated in the first experiment.
Attendance was limited because a one-way trip to Fort
Riley took 45 minutes and required passing through a
security gate and a variety of active firing range com-
plexes. All told, the experiment took at least four hours
of the participants' time. In the interest of time and effi-
ciency, we moved the second experiment to an on-cam-
pus facility (Quinlan Gardens). The setup was exactly
the same as the lane in Figure 1 with one exception.
The lane was set up in a small field rather than in a
building. Twenty-two students participated in the sec-
ond experiment.
The change in setting from inside to outdoors made
the leader-remote condition in Experiment 2 less
remote. In the leader-remote condition, the leader was
approximately 100 yards behind the lane but still visible
if the participant chose to look. In both experiments, all
communication in the remote condition was by two-way
radio.
Materials
Participants were given one paintball marker (gun),
one set of US Army fatigues, a set of elbow and kneepads,
and a paintball face shield. In the leader-remote condition,
participants were also given a two-way radio and instruc-
tions on its use.
Procedure
When participants arrived at the lane, a uniformed sol-
dier presented them with a standard battle-dress uniform
and asked them to put the uniform on. The participants
were then introduced to their leader, an army officer. The
leader briefed them using the official military Operations
Order format and addressed them by their last names.
They were then told to assemble in a staging area where
they could hear the activity in the assault lane while they
waited their turns. All of this was purposefully done to
immerse the participant in the experiment and to
heighten the sense of realism and their anxiety.
While waiting, participants were instructed on the
safety and use of the paintball markers and read a brief-
ing. Participants were sent down the lane individually.
Whenever the participants took aim at the targets or
moved between stations, they exposed themselves to the
sniper's fire. Participants were instructed to attempt to
shoot enemy targets without hitting friendly targets. No
measures were made of firing accuracy because our
hypothesis concerns the participant's reaction time to
commands given by the leader and says nothing about
their marksmanship. The shooting task was created only
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to give focus to the participant's activity and to enhance
the feel of a combat environment.
A small container with five paintballs was placed at
each of the eight stations. The 40 paintballs in the eight
containers were the participant's only ammunition. The
participant started at one end of the lane, shown by the X
in Figure 1. At this station and all subsequent stations, the
leader gave the participant the command "Fire" when he
judged it to be safe to do so. The time elapsed from the
issue of the command to the first shot fired is the first
dependent measure.
When the participants ran out of paintballs, they
reported "Out of ammo" to the leader, who then gave the
command "Move" when he judged it safe to do so. The
participants had to move across the lane to the next sta-
tion and immediately pick up its container of five paint-
balls. The time elapsed between the issue of the
command to move and the time the participant's hand
first touched the new supply of ammunition was the sec-
ond dependent measure. When the participants finished
loading, they reported "Loaded" to the leader who then
started the cycle over again with the command "Fire." To
measure reaction time, an observer would shadow the
participant and record elapsed time with a stopwatch.
Although we assume this method was accurate and effec-
tive, in the future we hope to record these data using bio-
metric telemetry.
In the leader-present condition, the leader was one sta-
tion behind the participant. In the leader-remote condition
the only contact between the leader and the participant
was by two-way radio.
Every participant ran through the lane twice, once with
the leader physically present and giving orders, and once
with the leader viewing the lane from a remote location
and giving orders through a two-way radio. The order of
conditions was counterbalanced across participants.
The study was intended to generate some anxiety so
that the measures would more readily generalize to the
battlefield. The major sources of stress were the fear of
being shot and actually being hit by paintballs. The pain
associated with being struck by a paintball is slight but
sudden and intense. Protective gear minimizes the risk of
injury. A registered nurse received remuneration for being
on site throughout the experiment.
Results
The purpose of this study was to test whether we can
observe any effect of leader presence on command and
control in a simulated combat environment. The partici-
pants were exposed to two conditions, leader-present
(face-to-face) communication, and leader-remote (two-
way radio) communication.
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Figure 2. (a) Histogram ofthe average differences in participants' response times to the command to move in Experiment J. Data are calcu-
lated as the time to move from one station to the next in the leader-remote condition less the time in the leader-present condition. (b) Histogram
ofthe average differences in participants' response times to the command to fire In Experiment J.
Experiment 1
Figure 2a is a histogram of the within-subject differ-
ence in response times to the command to move for the
participants in Experiment 1. The difference is calculated
by subtracting the average of the times observed in the
leader-present condition from the averages of the times
observed in the leader-remote condition. Of the 20 partic-
ipants, 15 took longer to move in the leader-remote condi-
tion than in the leader-present condition. A within-
subjects t test for these data, t( 19) = 2.958, P < .004, indi-
cates that response times to the command to move were
significantly longer in the leader-remote condition.
Figure 2b is the histogram of the within-subjects differ-
ence in response times to the command to shoot. The
data are, once again, calculated by subtracting the time
observed in the leader-present condition from the time
observed in the leader-remote condition. Of the 20 partic-
ipants, 12 took longer to shoot in the leader-remote con-
dition than in the leader-present condition. A within-
subjects t test for these data, t( 19) = 2.317, P < .016, indi-
cates that response times to the command to shoot were
significantly longer in the leader-remote condition.
Experiment 2
Figures 3a and 3b are histograms of the within-sub-
jects difference in response times to the commands to
move and to shoot, respectively, for the participants in
the second experiment. The data are calculated in the
same way as those shown in Figure 2. Of the 22 partici-
pants, 16 took longer to move in the leader-remote condi-
tion than in the leader-present condition. A within-
subjects t test for the move data indicates that the differ-
ence is significant t(21) = 2.798, P < .006. Of the 22 par-
ticipants, 15 took longer to shoot in the leader-remote
condition than in the leader-present condition. A within-
subjects t test for the fire data indicates that the difference
is significant t(21) = 2.211, P < .020.
Given the similarity of the two experiments' results, it
appears the subtle difference in the degree of remoteness
of the leader across the two experiments did not have a
significant impact on response times. The similarity also
allows us to aggregate the data. The test on the compos-
ite move data is significant t(41) = 4.122, P < .0001. The
test on the composite shoot data is also significant t(41)
= 3.218, p < .0013. These results support our hypothesis.
Participants were faster to react to the leader's com-
mands when the leader was present than when the leader
was remote.
Discussion
The two experiments reported here are the first in a
planned series of studies on leader presence and com-
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Figure 3. (a) Histogram ofthe average differences in participants' response times to the command to move in Experiment 2. (b) Histogram of
the average differences in participants' response times to the command to fire In Experiment 2.
mon ground. Common ground is the foundation for the
development of trust not only between troops and their
leader but also among individuals. The battlefield is an ex-
treme environment that serves as a metaphor for (too
much of) everyday life. Understanding the impact of the
erosion of common ground on the battlefield may suggest
constraints for the design of tools and information devices
that facilitate the development of common ground and,
eventually, trust. This is our long-term goal. In the short
term, data acquisition is continuing in a paintball assault
lane in Sweden. We are now using automated biometric
telemetry to eliminate the possibility of observer error in
the measurement of response times and to assess psy-
chophysiological indicators of stress.
In Praise of the Paradigm
It is simply not possible to simulate a combat environ-
ment in a laboratory. Our desire for ecological validity forced
us to work outside the normal laboratory setting. For the first
experiment, our assault lane was set in a building on an
active Army base. The lane in the second experiment was
set up in a lightly wooded field on campus.
Embedding experimental controls in a simulated com-
bat environment is a new concept in human factors
research. To attain ecological validity, we immersed par-
ticipants into a pseudo-military environment by providing
military uniforms, speaking in military command style,
and by keeping the age group in line with that of the mili-
tary. This procedure gives us the ability to generalize the
results of the experiments to real-world battlefield settings.
Admittedly, paintball is not actual combat and our
assault land cannot be said to be a truly extreme environ-
ment. Unlike a battlefield, the paintball assault lane allows
us to exercise experimental control. However, it retains
viable levels of several battlefield stressors including inter-
active hostility and the unannounced onset of sharp pain.
The presence of these and other stressors makes the
paintball lane an excellent natural laboratory for investi-
gating the extreme environment faced by battlefield sol-
diers.
In addition to its face validity, the paintball paradigm
has two highly desirable features. First, the availability of
commercial paintball facilities make it possible for others
to replicate and expand upon these and future experi-
ments. Second, because paintball is a recreational activity
(for the young), it has an ethical neutrality that makes it
acceptable (if not palatable) to most members of Institu-
tional Review Boards. This in itself is a coup. Paintball
opens research on battlefield stressors to the scientific
community at large.
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Author Note
The views expressed in this work are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect official Army policy.
This work was supported by the DOD Multidisciplinary
University Research Initiative (MURI) program adminis-
tered by the Army Research Office under grant DAAD 19-
01-1-0621. Dr. Elmar Schmeisser is the project monitor.
The credit for conceiving these experiments and for their
success goes to 2nd Lt. Keith Pangburn.
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